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Toward an Effective Minilateralism: The 
Polish Experience in the Visegrad Group 
after 2004
by Dominik P. Jankowski and Małgorzata Grzegrzółka
Summary
This analysis has three predominant goals. The first is to provide a retrospective over-
view of  the political and economic changes in Poland after its accession to the Euro-
pean Union in 2004. The second is a prospective one, which aims to analyze the Polish 
perspective on the Visegrad cooperation as well as on European integration in the next 
years. The third is to present a foreign policy strategy for Poland until 2020.
The concept of  regionalization is one of  the backbones of  this analysis. In the current 
context, the role of  the Visegrad Group (V4) – as a subregional grouping within the 
EU – should be perceived as crucial. A smart V4 cooperation will not lead to further 
fragmentation of  the EU. On the contrary, the process of  regionalization will be trans-
formed into an effective “minilateralism”. The Visegrad Group can be regarded as the 
best example of  cooperation in the minilateral format, with Polish participation. It is an 
antidote to the newly voiced skepticism to EU integration. Its foundation was built on 
the ability of  these four countries to propose projects and initiatives that go beyond the 
common denominator of  purely regional interests, leading to a formation of  a coalition 
with other countries (V4 Plus).
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Toward an Effective Minilateralism: The Polish 
Experience in the Visegrad Group after 2004
by Dominik P. Jankowski and Małgorzata Grzegrzółka
It all started with a simple but more than accurate 
question. Does Central Europe exist? It was asked 
by Timothy Garton Ash in his famous 1983 article 
for the The New York Review of  Books.1 In fact, he 
not only proved that this region has played a vital 
role in European history, but also foresaw its forthco-
ming revival; “In the last few years we have begun to 
talk again about Central Europe, and in the present 
tense. This new discussion originated not in Berlin or 
Vienna, but in Prague and Budapest. The man who 
more than anyone else has given it currency in the 
West is a Czech, Milan Kundera. Subsequently, the 
Germans and the Austrians have gingerly begun to 
rehabilitate, in their different ways, a concept that was 
once so much their own. The East German leader, 
Erich Honecker, talks of  the danger of  nuclear war 
in Mitteleuropa. The West German Social Democrat, 
Peter Glotz, says the Federal Republic is ‘a guarantee-
power of  the culture of  Mitteleuropa’; whatever that 
means. And Kurt Waldheim’s Vienna recently hosted 
a symposium with the electrifying title Heimat Mit-
teleuropa. A backhanded tribute to the new actuality 
of  the Central European idea comes even from the 
central organ of  the Polish United Workers’ Party, 
Trybuna Ludu, which earlier this year published a 
splenetic attack on what it called ‘The Myth of  Cen-
tral Europe.’”2
The re-emergence of  the region as a whole caused 
some novel challenges. For some, it meant an intellec-
tual revolution; various intellectuals commenced their 
search of  a true “Homo Visegradicus” (as if  Central 
European societies had ever been homogenous). One 
of  the definitions was coined by the Hungarian histo-
rian Róbert Kiss-Szemán: “Here is the Visegrad man, 
explosive but generous with his hospitality, cautious 
and careful but fresh and capable of  winning, because 
he looks to the future in an ingenious and optimistic 
fashion.”3 For others, it triggered a mental and linguis-
tic change. One recalls the lexical difficulty that former 
United States Secretary of  State Henry Kissinger had 
when delivering a speech in Warsaw in 1990. The sen-
tence “I am delighted to be here in Eastern, I mean 
Central Europe” has gone down in history.4
Nowadays, there is no longer any need to ask the 
famous Central European existential question. Indeed, 
Central Europe – the emanation of  which is the Vise-
grad Group (V4) – has finally secured its place on the 
European scene.
This analysis has two predominant goals. The first is 
to provide a retrospective overview of  the political 
and economic changes in Poland after its accession to 
the European Union in 2004. The second is a pros-
pective one: to analyze the Polish perspective on the 
Visegrad cooperation as well as the European integra-
tion in the forthcoming years.
The Polish perspective on the V4 is especially vital 
in a situation where one deals with two – to some 
extent contradictory – trends: growing regionaliza-
tion in Europe and a political willingness to conti-
nue deepening EU integration.
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The concept of  regionalization is one of  the 
backbones of  this analysis. In general, subregional 
cooperation has been defined as “a process of  
regularized, significant political and economic inter-
action among a group of  neighboring states. This 
interaction takes place between national govern-
ments, local authorities, private business, and civil 
society actors across a wide range of  issues.”5 The 
rapid proliferation of  groupings after the fall of  
the Berlin Wall – with the V4 among them – gene-
rated a need to understand the rationale, potential, 
and limitations of  the “children of  the post–Cold 
War era”.6 When one takes into consideration 
the link between EU integration and subregional 
cooperation, postwar experiences suggest four cate-
gories of  groupings: pioneer, substitute, comple-
ment, and involuntary alternative.7
However, as Marko Papic emphasizes, “regionali-
zation is currently most evident in security matters, 
but it is only a matter of  time before it begins to 
manifest itself  in political and economic matters 
as well. The security regionalization of  Europe is 
not a good sign for the future of  the eurozone. A 
monetary union cannot be grafted onto security 
disunion, especially if  the solution to the eurozone 
crisis becomes more integration.”8 In this context, 
the role of  the V4 – as a subregional grouping 
within the EU – should be perceived as crucial. A 
smart V4 cooperation will not lead to further frag-
mentation of  the EU. On the contrary, the process 
of  regionalization will be transformed into an 
effective “minilateralism”.
1. Retrospective Overview
1.1 Evolution of Polish Foreign Policy
The beginning of  the twenty-first century was 
marked by an important change on the Polish poli-
tical scene. In fact, 2003 was a turning point for 
the ruling party, of  the Democratic Left Alliance 
(Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD). A variety of  
factors caused a considerable decline in support for 
the government. These included discontent with 
government spending cuts (especially for healthcare 
and education), the high unemployment rate, and a 
series of  corruption scandals (the so called “Rywin 
scandal” and “Starachowice scandal”). This led to 
the resignation of  the prime minister, Leszek Miller, 
in May 2004. On May 2, 2004, Marek Belka was 
sworn in as the new head of  the government. Just 
one day earlier, Poland and nine other countries 
became members of  the European Union.
Parliamentary elections were held on September 
25, 2005. The defeat of  the governing parties 
came as no surprise (SLD lost 162 seats); the right-
wing parties won a large parliamentary majority. 
The conservative Law and Justice party (Prawo 
i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) won 155 of  460 seats in 
Polish parliament, the Sejm (27 percent of  the 
votes), and the liberal-conservative Civic Platform 
(Platforma Obywatelska, PO) won 133 (24 percent 
of  the votes). After a failed attempt to create a 
government with a coalition of  both parties, it was 
Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz from PiS who was sworn 
as prime minister. His minority cabinet was appoin-
ted on October 31, 2005.
The foreign policy of  the new government was aimed 
at “making optimum use of  the vast possibilities given 
by the European Union.”9 In 2006, the minister of  
foreign affairs, Stefan Meller, emphasized that “we 
must elaborate a studied, analysis-based strategy for 
our actions in the Union. This is facilitated by the 
period of  reflection inside the Union, which should 
address not only institutional change but also res-
titution of  the Europeans’ faith in the integration 
project. This period of  reflection should be treated in 
Poland as an impulse for a broader debate on our EU 
strategy.”10 The role of  regional groupings was also 
stressed in the annual address to the Sejm. Indeed, 
both bilateral and regional relations played a crucial 
role in the foreign policy concept of  the Law and 
Justice party, as they “remain the prime foundation of  
international life.”11 The V4 was considered to be a 
good platform for cooperation on European Union 
issues and East European policy. Moreover, “its effec-
tiveness would be boosted if  Baltic and Scandinavian 
partners joined in this cooperation on matters of  
common interest. You could say that the focus on 
the East-West axis, so characteristic of  Polish foreign 
policy, should be increasingly supplemented with new 
accents and greater attention to the North-South 
axis.”12
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Like the new government, Polish society also 
understood the need for deeper European integra-
tion. The number of  Poles satisfied with EU mem-
bership was constantly rising. In 2006, 56 percent 
of  Poles thought that membership was beneficial 
for the country. Only 7 percent had a negative 
assessment.13 This percentage of  those who con-
sidered that EU membership was something good 
was higher than it was immediately after accession 
in 2004 (42 percent). Moreover, both government 
and the public shared the view that further enlar-
gement of  the European Union was needed. Only 
16 percent of  Poles opposed enlargement, while 72 
percent supported it.14
On July 7, 2006, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz infor-
med the political committee of  the Law and Justice 
party of  his resignation. He was succeeded by the 
leader of  the party, Jarosław Kaczyński, on July 
14, 2006. Anna Fotyga became the minister of  for-
eign affairs in the new government. In the annual 
address in 2007, she underlined that membership 
in the European Union to date should be judged 
as undeniably positive. “Efficient and stable poli-
tical institutions, dynamic economic growth, and 
a prudent European policy all enhance Poland’s 
authority and prestige. Thanks to our membership 
in the European Union we have gained many new 
political and economic opportunities, which we 
are using to reduce the gap separating us from the 
most advanced countries of  the world.”15
According to the Eurobarometer surveys conduc-
ted in 2007, Poles rarely believed that their voice 
counted in the EU (only 37 percent). At the same 
time, they were convinced that Poland’s voice did 
count (68 percent respectively).16 Moreover, despite 
the government’s reservation, the majority of  Poles 
(69 percent) were in favor of  a new European tre-
aty. In fact, the support for the treaty in Poland was 
higher than the European average (66 percent).17
Simultaneously, in 2007, support for the govern-
ment decreased considerably. In these circum-
stances, the Sejm voted its own dissolution on 
September 6, 2007. The Civic Platform party won 
the elections (41.5 percent; 209 seats) and its lea-
der, Donald Tusk, was sworn in as the new prime 
minister on November 16, 2007.18 The new minis-
ter of  foreign affairs, Radosław Sikorski, presented 
the foreign policy concept in May 2008. He high-
lighted the fact that national interests should not be 
perceived as contrary to the process of  European 
integration – “the European Union is not a dange-
rous ‘them’; Europe and the EU, it is us.”19 In fact, 
this annual address laid the foundations for the 
revival of  the “Piast concept.”20 Both historically 
and currently, it is identified with the idea of  wes-
ternization, attachment to Europe and its ideas, a 
close relationship with western countries, and prag-
matism in international relations, while avoiding 
imprudent adventures in the east.
In 2008, support for Polish membership in the 
EU remained at a high level (65 percent). Howe-
ver, trust in the EU was decreasing. In 2007, the 
EU was trusted by 68 percent, by 2008 only by 55 
percent.21 Moreover, 2008 marked the beginning 
of  the economic crisis, which was also reflected in 
the polls. Consequently, its impact was seen in the 
attitude of  Poles toward the European Monetary 
Union (EMU). Compared to the previous two 
years (a stable support of  63 percent), only 44 per-
cent of  Poles were in favor of  the EMU.22
Over the next few years, Poland’s position in the 
EU gradually strengthened. Two issues were of  
special importance: firstly, Polish involvement – 
especially of  President Lech Kaczyński – in solving 
the Georgian crisis in August 2008; secondly, the 
Eastern Partnership (initially, a Polish-Swedish initi-
ative), which was ultimately transformed into a joint 
European project. This allowed the government to 
draw optimistic conclusions about Poland’s role in 
the EU: “After twenty years of  successful system 
transformation and integration with the Western 
structures, Poland takes its deserved place among 
the leading players of  the European league.”23
The next parliamentary elections in Poland were 
held on October 9, 2011, during the Polish presi-
dency of  the Council of  the European Union (July 
1, 2011 – December 31, 2011). The Civic Platform 
party won once again (39 percent; 209 seats in the 
Sejm), and Donald Tusk became the first prime 
minister of  Poland to be appointed for a second 
consecutive term since 1990. During its Council 
presidency, Poland promoted three slogans: Euro-
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pean integration as a source of  growth; a secure 
Europe; and a Europe benefiting from openness. 
Since then, Polish European policy has not been 
greatly modified. The mid-term foreign policy 
goals were for the first time presented in a spe-
cial document released by the ministry of  foreign 
affairs in March 2012. Its publication was linked to 
the adoption by Poland’s council of  ministers of  
Polish foreign policy priorities, including Poland’s 
strategy for the European Union for the years 
2012–16. This document had two primary aims: 
to present to the citizens the vision, priorities, and 
overall foreign policy tasks, as well as to coordinate 
the work of  government agencies.
In the document, the Polish vision of  the EU 
was described by three words: competitiveness, 
solidarity, and openness. “Pursuing deeper Euro-
pean integration, both economic and political, is 
important. European institutions should also be 
strengthened so that they can effectively implement 
their tasks. Hopefully, the European Union will 
eventually become a political union. This vision 
should not be regarded as a super state that wipes 
out economic or identity interests of  individual 
member states. From Poland’s point of  view, the 
following elements are needed: an efficient and 
effective single market, including a single digital 
market and a single energy market; an effectively 
operating labor market, without barriers to the free 
movement of  workers when it comes to recogni-
zing their professional qualifications or the trans-
fer of  their pension rights; creating a European 
research space; an ambitious EU budget, with an 
adequate share for the Cohesion Policy and Com-
mon Agricultural Policy.”24 Table 1 presents the 
tasks to be achieved by Poland in the EU by 2016.
Table 1: Tasks to be achieved by Poland in the EU by 2016
1. Gradual implementation of the “Europe 2020” Strategy
2. Progress on the path to membership in the euro zone in line with developments
3. Preserving the EU’s ambitious budget in the 2014–2020 financial perspective, with adequate share allocated to the 
Cohesion Policy and the Common Agricultural Policy; leveling direct payments for farmers
4. Completion of the EU’s single market and support for measures boosting the EU’s competitiveness, including develo-
ping a common trade policy, which adequately realizes the EU’s economic interests in the world
5. Creation of an effective common EU energy policy: development of a single energy market, improving security of sup-
plies, increasing energy efficiency, shifting emphasis from “low-coal economy” to a “low-emission economy”, supporting 
the exploration of natural gas and crude oil from unconventional deposits
6. Actions aimed at the full implementation of 2008 decisions that the EU will reduce its emissions by 20 percent by the 
year 2020. Actions to formulate EU climate policy until 2030 should respect member states’ sovereign right to decide 
about the structure of their energy mix and will be adjusted to the level of development and the structure of member sta-
tes’ economies. 
7. Enhancing Poland’s say on the implementation of the Eastern policy and on the future of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy 
8. Ensuring that the EU speaks with one voice at G20 meetings, in international organizations, as well as in relations with 
strategic partners
9. Active participation in the EU’s actions aimed at creating an effective system of migration control, guaranteeing security, 
and preventing terrorist threats. 
Source: Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012–2016 (Warsaw, 2012) pp. 12–13. http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/
d31571cf-d24f-4479-af09-c9a46cc85cf6:JCR
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In 2012, public opinion polls showed a decrease 
in confidence in the EU among Poles (from 55 
percent in 2008 to 48 percent in 2012).25 By 2012 
Poles also indicated that they were more aware of  
the problems within the European Union, and that 
they wanted to see more individual benefits of  EU 
membership. Some 68 percent of  the Polish popu-
lation expected mainly economic action from the 
EU, i.e. measures aimed at improving the standard 
of  living, increasing wages and pensions, and crea-
ting new jobs.
It cannot be denied that there has been a change 
in the attitude of  Poles toward the EU. Their con-
fidence and enthusiasm has become less obvious. 
The reasons for this can be found both in the crisis 
that emerged in 2008 as well as in the growing 
expectations of  the population. Poles see some 
clear benefits that membership in the EU offered 
to their country, but the benefits have become less 
visible on a personal level.
1.2 How did Poland survive the Economic 
Crisis?
One could say that Poland is the only country in 
the EU to have confidently withstood the recent 
widespread financial and economic crisis. Indeed, 
as the rest of  Europe found itself  in a deep reces-
sion – followed by an unstable recovery – Poland 
enjoyed continuous growth, ranging from 1.6 per-
cent in 2009 to 4 percent in 2011 (with 2.1 percent 
in 2012). Moreover, since 2008, Poland has mana-
ged to increase its GDP by 19 percent, while the 
EU’s GDP as a whole has struggled to return to 
pre-crisis levels.26 As a result, the nation has impro-
ved its position within Europe, raising its GDP per 
capita from 54 percent of  the EU average in 2007 
to 67 percent in 2012.
On November 30, 2008, the Polish government 
presented its program: “Stability and Development 
Plan – Strengthening the Polish Economy in the 
Time of  the World Financial Crisis.”27 Its primary 
goal was to protect the Polish economy from the 
negative impact of  the global downturn. The prio-
rity of  the National Reforms Program for 2008–11 
(Krajowy Program Reform na lata 2008–2011) was 
to improve the quality of  life of  the citizens and 
thus create a favorable environment for the deve-
lopment of  entrepreneurship and ensure effective 
management of  public funds by institutions. The 
national reforms program was therefore to be 
carried out in three priority areas: active society, 
innovative economy, and efficient institutions.28 
The government’s plan amounted to 22.5 billion 
euros (91 billion PLN). Its main activities included 
maintaining the stability of  public finances, initi-
atives aimed at making the financial system stable 
(e.g. guaranties for deposits and credit schemes for 
small and medium enterprises), the acceleration of  
investments financed with EU structural funds, and 
setting up a financial stability committee.
Witold M. Orłowski has outlined six key elements 
of  Polish success during the crisis. First, Poland 
has remained attractive to foreign investors and has 
enjoyed the competitive advantage as a production 
site. Second, Poland did not join the eurozone 
prior to the crisis and has therefore had a more 
flexible exchange rate regime. In fact, Poland was 
able to devalue the złoty, which helped maintain 
its exports and keep jobs in the country. Third, 
households and firms did not become overly indeb-
ted, which led to a high degree of  financial stability. 
Fourth, Poland has a relatively large internal market 
that proved resilient to the economic slowdown. 
Fifth, the continuous inflow of  EU structural 
funds allowed Poland to continue its infrastructure 
development projects (e.g. in relation to the 2012 
UEFA European Football Championship). Six, the 
German market – key to the Polish economy – was 
not hurt drastically during the crisis and currently 
continues to grow.29
Mitchell A. Orenstein added one more aspect to 
this: the education system. In a recent article in 
Foreign Affairs he emphasized that “since 1989, 
Poles have continued to invest heavily in their edu-
cation, learning English, building new private uni-
versities, and participating in the Erasmus student-
exchange program among European universities. 
Poland now has the second-highest rate of  college 
enrollment in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development.”30
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However, one should note that the economic crisis 
has significantly changed the political landscape 
within the European Union, causing a shift in the 
European integration process. Therefore, from 
a political perspective, the position of  Poland 
on the international scene has been considerably 
challenged.
1.3 Political Controversies: The Lisbon 
Treaty – a Challenge or a Chance for 
Poland?
One of  the biggest EU-related controversies at 
the national level was the protracted ratification of  
the Lisbon Treaty. In May 2007, the government 
stressed the necessity to reach a compromise. Anna 
Fotyga stressed that “a constitutional treaty, or, 
putting it differently, a basic treaty, is not essential 
for streamlining the decision-making process in 
the European Union. It is needed to put the legal 
system in order. Poland supports this. However, 
we do want the debate to be calm and prudent, 
without coercion, because we are talking about the 
most crucial elements. Here, in this country, there 
should be no rush to a quick adoption of  the treaty, 
because it is important that the treaty should be 
good.”31
A compromise was finally reached in December 
2007 in Lisbon and was based on the agreement 
that the principle of  double majority – regulating 
the qualified majority voting scheme – will come 
into force gradually. The compromise thus intro-
duced a transitional period beneficial to the smaller 
EU member states. In fact, the Lisbon Treaty sti-
pulates that the voting arrangements of  the Nice 
Treaty will apply until October 31, 2014. Moreover, 
until March 31, 2017, any member state can request 
that the Nice Treaty rules be used for a particular 
vote.
In Poland the ratification process of  the Lisbon 
Treaty was conducted in accordance with Article 
90 Paragraph 2 of  the Polish constitution.32 It 
therefore excluded the possibility of  conducting a 
nationwide referendum on this issue – a solution 
supported primarily by the Law and Justice party. 
In fact, this party raised numerous reservations 
about the treaty itself. According to the Law and 
Justice party, the introduction of  the Lisbon Treaty 
could endanger the sovereignty of  the nation states, 
as it was supposed to grant more powers to the EU 
and its institutions. Moreover, it would better serve 
the interests of  the big EU states at the expense 
of  the smaller ones. Finally, some expressed their 
concerns about the possible negative impact of  
the treaty on the cultural and social heritage of  the 
member states.33
On April 1, 2008, the Sejm passed a special law 
(384 deputies in favor; 56 against; 12 abstentions) 
allowing the president to ratify the treaty. On 
April 2, 2008, the Senate accepted the law voted 
by the Sejm (74 senators in favor; 17 against; 6 
abstentions).
However, the rejection of  the Lisbon Treaty in a 
referendum in Ireland on June 12, 2008, stopped 
the ratification process in Poland. Lech Kaczyński 
was only ready to sign the treaty after the Irish 
position was subsequently changed in 2009. This 
stance caused tensions between the Polish pre-
sident and the government. In 2009, Radosław 
Sikorski stated: “The crisis surrounding ratification 
of  the Lisbon Treaty is the joint failure of  Europe. 
We are certain that the treaty serves our interests by 
strengthening the political dimension of  the Euro-
pean Union, reinforcing solidarity and deepening 
integration, in particular in foreign and security 
policy. We already know that it is safer to sail the 
stormy waves of  global politics and economy not 
on a national boat, but on a European liner. The 
government believes that finalization of  the ratifi-
cation process of  the Lisbon Treaty lies in our inte-
rest since we need the European Union to thrive 
and to act in unison in external relations, to guard 
the principles of  free competition, and draw power 
from the diversity of  its member states in internal 
affairs.”34
Finally, a second referendum in Ireland was held on 
October 2, 2009, with 67 percent of  Irish voters 
in favor. This positive outcome allowed Lech 
Kaczyński to ratify the treaty on October 10, 2009.
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2. Perspectives
2.1 Toward V4 Minilateralism
Europe as we knew it no longer exists. The whole 
continent is undergoing a process of  dramatic 
change. Since 2008 “the crisis” has been the term 
most frequently repeated to describe the political, 
economic, and social condition of  the “old con-
tinent”. Irrespective of  whether the assessment 
is made on the level of  the EU member states or 
in terms of  the European Union as a whole, the 
message remains predominantly negative. Euro-
pean decision makers – including Polish ones 
– have believed that the crisis would evolve into 
a catalyst for a positive adjustment in the func-
tioning of  the EU as well as constituting a solid 
foundation for creating a new model for political, 
economic, and social development in Europe.35 
The crisis provided an opportunity to reduce the 
deficit of  democratic legitimacy36 and to allow 
greater involvement of  European societies in the 
decision-making process. Such an approach could 
in turn facilitate further European integration, 
which could in the long term lead to a transfor-
mation of  the EU into a European federation.37 
As Nicolas Berggruen and Nathan Gardels stated, 
“although a federal Europe must be open to all 
EU member states, forward movement toward it 
should not be blocked because some are not yet 
willing to go there, but nor should it be imposed 
from on high. The democratic public of  each 
state will have to decide whether it is in its long-
term interest to join the federation or opt out. 
It is an illusion to believe that a strong political 
union can be built on the weak allegiance that 
results from tweaking treaties. Its foundation must 
be a popular mandate.” Yet this approach remains 
fairly distant from the official standpoint of  
many EU member states and challenges the real 
vision of  the integration presented by European 
societies.
In fact, the opportunity to use the crisis as an 
impetus to introduce overall changes in Europe has 
inexorably been moving toward an end. This situa-
tion is due to at least three reasons.
Firstly, there is an increase of  anti-EU (and anti-
elite) populism – the result of  both the radicaliza-
tion of  the political scene in many EU countries 
as well as the weakness of  European elites. The 
latter were extremely exposed to criticism as they 
were offering technocratic solutions to political 
problems.38 “Populism is politics without policies; 
technocracy is policy without politics.”39
Secondly, Europe has started to move away from 
its roots. Jakub Grygiel noted that “Europe’s mess 
and decline pose a policy problem that requires 
civilizational solutions. The fiscal crisis can be mea-
sured; the political inefficiency can be described; 
the tax rates can be adjusted upward or downward; 
policies can be tinkered with. But Europe’s under-
lying sense of  a raison d’être can be restored only 
by a slow regeneration of  its foundations based on 
history, religion, and culture.”40 A similar argument 
was presented by Dominique Moïsi, who coined 
the term “culture of  fear”, which has been domi-
nating the old continent.41 It is characterized by a 
gradual move away from European roots, caused, 
inter alia, by a massive increase of  the number of  
immigrants to Europe. A “culture of  fear”, com-
pounded by a lack of  belief  in one’s own abilities, 
has paralyzed the actions of  Europeans in many 
areas, including in the sphere of  external relations.
Thirdly, European societies are not ready to seek 
far-reaching objectives. This stance therefore decre-
ases their interest in the outside world, even in the 
closest one: its neighborhood. Despite the acce-
lerating rate of  globalization – which allows the 
flow of  ideas, people, capital, and technology on a 
global scale – what counts among European socie-
ties today is primarily the ability to solve current 
problems.
Poland – like many other EU member states – has 
not been immune to these European diseases. In 
order to overcome them, Poland’s rationale has 
been to seek inclusion in Western European affairs 
and establish its place as one of  the top five mem-
ber states of  the EU. Roderick Parkes pointed out 
that “Warsaw’s understanding of  power was not 
about increasing the country’s coercive influence, 
but about being dynamic, enjoying the exercise 
of  power, and realizing its potential.”42 Yet the 
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growing number of  member states has altered 
the reality of  the decision-making process within 
the EU. In these circumstances, from a Polish 
perspective, two issues remain crucial to achieving 
long-term national goals: to determine a group of  
countries intent on pursuing concrete joint interests 
(exceeding a simple economic integration rationale); 
to define these joint interests and the scope of  a 
potential cooperation.43
The participation of  Poland in deepening the integ-
ration process requires a continuous improvement of  
effectiveness in the state’s functioning, i.e. economic 
efficiency, proven management skills, and a clear inte-
gration strategy. An alternative scenario – in which 
one does not prioritize its internal institutional and 
economic effectiveness – leads to self-marginalization.
Poland’s position in the EU also derives from the 
quality of  the integration itself. The further erosion of  
EU institutional capabilities could therefore constitute 
a serious challenge for Poland. In this situation, one 
should look for ways of  consolidating and strengthe-
ning the European integration process. A potential 
answer might be hidden in minilateralism.
The essence of  minilateralism lies in the ability to 
build lasting coalitions. The term was introduced into 
international literature in the 1980s.44 At the beginning, 
it was mainly associated with the process of  liberali-
zation of  international trade, including the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its 
successor, the World Trade Organization.45 At that 
time, minilateralism did not have a clear positive con-
notation, as it was perceived as a potential threat to 
multilateralism – still being treated as a model solution 
in international politics. Indeed, one feared that mini-
lateralism could lead to the weakening of  international 
cooperation, as it could cause further divisions among 
countries and reduce the scale of  liberalization of  
international trade.46 Accordingly, minilateral solutions 
could be seen as a temptation to return to economic 
protectionism.
The concept of  minilateralism won more positive 
renown in 2009, thanks to Moisés Naím. In his 
article “Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get 
Real International Action”, he defined minilatera-
lism as the “smallest possible number of  countries 
needed to have the largest possible impact on sol-
ving a particular problem.”47 The number of  coun-
tries will vary accordingly with the character of  the 
problems and their significance for international 
relations. For Naim, to solve a global problem, this 
number should oscillate around twenty. In fact, the 
G20 could be perceived as the best exemplification 
of  this rule: it includes countries from six conti-
nents and accounts for 85 percent of  the world’s 
economy. Naím offered other examples: “Same 
with climate change. There, too, the magic number 
is about 20: The world’s 20 top polluters account 
for 75 percent of  the planet’s greenhouse gas emis-
sions. As for HIV/AIDS, 19 countries account 
for nearly two thirds of  the world’s AIDS-related 
deaths.”48
Minilateralism therefore offers a tangible solution 
to overcoming the crises of  multilateralism, inclu-
ding the erosion of  EU integration. In reality, the 
agreements concluded in a framework of  a smaller 
grouping may constitute a starting point for further 
negotiations and an inclusion of  new members 
in the process. However, the innate nature of  
minilateralism hides some potential challenges. In 
fact, if  not sufficiently and properly coordinated, 
minilateral agreements might lead to a growing 
exclusiveness of  the formats, and eventually to 
an uncontrolled version of  a multi-speed Europe. 
Thus, minilateralism should in principle be inclu-
sive and transparent.
Moreover, one should not confine minilateralism 
to solving global issues. The use of  this approach 
is justified and also represents an added value in 
regional cooperation. In this case, the number of  
participating countries can be considerably smaller. 
However, a prerequisite for success of  such an 
initiative is the inclusion of  a regional leader in the 
establishment of  such a coalition.
How does the V4 fit into this scheme? For Edward 
Lucas, it is an unnecessary structure. “Visegrad 
has a whiff  of  the Commonwealth – a haphazard 
collection of  countries held together by memories 
of  shared history, some strong common cultural 
ties in the elite, and a love of  cricket. No British 
prime minister would dream of  trying to wind up 
the Commonwealth, or of  ignoring it. It has a use-
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ful role in keeping diplomatic channels open that 
might otherwise be closed. It does good work on 
culture, development, and other soft issues. But it 
would be foolish to put it at the heart of  British 
foreign policy. The other stuff  is more important. 
The same goes for Visegrad.”49
However, the effectiveness of  this coalition to date 
has proved to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Slovakia that the presence of  a major partner in the 
V4, i.e. Poland, has been vital to the promotion of  
their national interests. From a Polish perspective, it 
also appears that the Visegrad cooperation not only 
does not weaken the Polish position in relations 
with major EU partners but in fact strengthens it. 
One could also note that the V4 goal is to balance 
relations with its large neighbor, Germany. Ger-
many is the principal focus of  each of  the V4’s 
foreign and economic policies, and the European 
Union provides a means of  reframing the relation-
ship on a more equal and stable basis.50
The scale of  the V4’s clout can be also represented 
by comparing the voting weights of  the member 
states in the Council of  the European Union. 
Indeed, the total number of  votes held by the V4 
countries (Poland 27, the Czech Republic 12, Hun-
gary 12, Slovakia 7) equals that of  Germany and 
France combined (Germany 29, France 29). 
The Visegrad Group can therefore be regarded as 
the best example of  cooperation in the minilateral 
format with Polish participation. It is an antidote to 
the newly voiced skepticism toward EU integration. 
Its foundation was built on the ability of  these four 
countries to propose projects and initiatives that go 
beyond the common denominator of  purely regi-
onal interests, leading to a formation of  a coalition 
with other countries (V4 Plus). This allows the V4 
to be progressively more effective in tackling the 
challenges linked to globalization.
The strengthening of  the V4 consequently became 
one of  the priorities of  Polish foreign policy. In 
2013, in his yearly address to the Sejm, Sikorski 
stated: “A strong Poland in the EU also means a 
stronger Visegrad Group. This is because Central 
Europe is no longer – as Milan Kundera once 
wrote in his famous essay – a land of  tragedy. It is 
more reminiscent of  the dream, at last fulfilled, of  
the free and prosperous region described by the 
Hungarian writer György Konrád, or of  the inte-
grated region of  Czechoslovakian Prime Minister 
Milan Hodža. The potential of  our part of  Europe 
is already quite significant – and getting ever stron-
ger. In recent years, the growth rate of  Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary surpassed 
the EU average. In the mid-1990s, the GDP of  the 
four Visegrad Group countries amounted to almost 
USD 270 billion. Today, it is almost four times 
larger. Together, we are Germany’s biggest tra-
ding partner – more important than, for example, 
France.”51
2.2 EU Economic Integration
The current sovereign debt crisis has caused a shift 
in the European integration process. In fact, 18 
eurozone members have been pushed toward a 
deeper economic and – more importantly – politi-
cal integration. This situation raises crucial questi-
ons for the remaining EU member states. It cannot 
be denied that a “deeper cooperation among a sub-
group of  member states is not a new phenomenon 
within the European Union, the euro zone crisis 
has given ‘differentiated integration’ a new and alte-
red quality.”52 What 18 euro zone members have 
created could actually be called an integrated core 
of  the EU. Its further development could have an 
effect on numerous other EU policies as the core 
intensifies its cooperation both within and outside 
the EU treaty framework.
Further integration of  this sort within the euro-
zone thus remains a challenge for Poland (which 
is committed to adopting the euro). However, in 
the last three years, the adoption of  the common 
currency has not been a highly discussed issue in 
Poland. The country still does not fulfill the criteria 
necessary to enter the eurozone. There is never-
theless agreement among the political elites that 
the decision about currency change should only be 
taken after the stabilization of  the eurozone.53 Yet, 
both the National Bank of  Poland and the Polish 
government believe that setting a date for the 
adoption of  the euro by Poland could strengthen 
its position in the EU integration process and 
simultaneously place it near its core. At the same 
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time, this standpoint could provoke social tensions, 
as public support for the euro is at a record low.54 
In fact, in March 2013, only 29 percent of  Poles 
supported Poland’s adhesion to the eurozone (com-
pared to 44 percent in 2007), while 64 percent were 
against it (compared to 46 percent in 2007).55 The 
government is therefore afraid that the domestic 
costs of  compliance with the eurozone criteria will 
undermine its electoral support.
Agata Gostyńska and Nicolai von Ondarza stressed 
that “since 2011, differentiated forms of  coopera-
tion have become regular tools in eurozone reform, 
with eurozone members signing a declaration on 
the Euro Plus Pact (signed by at that time 17 euro 
members plus six non-eurozone members) and 
entering into two international agreements – the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM, only for 
the euro members) and the Treaty on the Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union (the so called fiscal compact, 
which was signed by at that time by 17 eurozone 
members plus eight non-eurozone members). 
Moreover, in October 2012 a group of  11 euro-
zone members agreed to initiate enhanced coopera-
tion for a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT).”56
In these circumstances, Poland had to act to dis-
miss a perspective of  eventually finding itself  on 
Europe’s periphery. Poland has signed two pacts: 
the Euro Plus Pact and the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination, and Governance in the EMU, both 
aimed at tightening economic coordination in 
Europe. In fact, Polish strategy regarding further 
euro area integration could be based on three 
pillars.
The first pillar is that Poland should counteract any 
initiatives leading toward a further fragmentation 
of  the single market. The second is that it should 
argue that only the EU framework ensures a suf-
ficient level of  economic and political coherence. 
Consequently, all future projects concerning the 
integration of  the euro area should be organized 
within the EU’s institutional, legal, and political 
framework. And last but not least the third pillar is 
that EU integrity should constitute a basis for any 
discussions on how to increase the democratic legi-
timization of  the integration project.
Furthermore, from a Polish perspective, the ban-
king union is a potentially contentious topic and 
poses an important dilemma. On the one hand, any 
initiative aimed at reducing instability and fragmen-
tation in the eurozone’s financial sector is in the 
Polish interest. Such activities “spread the benefits 
of  the eurozone’s single monetary policy through 
greater market integration and create macro-pru-
dential tools to prevent uncontrolled cross-border 
capital flows.”57
On the other hand, Poland should not unconditio-
nally support the strengthening of  the European 
supervisory system. In fact, there is a legitimate 
fear that common supervision will have a negative 
impact on the safety and soundness of  Poland’s 
own banking sector, since its ownership is mainly 
controlled by the large banking groups from the 
eurozone. Therefore it cannot be excluded that 
the new supervisory system could back their inte-
rests at the expense of  the subsidiaries in Central 
Europe.
So how should the banking union be designed? It 
is in Poland’s interest to shape the discussion in 
such a way that it includes the core assumption 
of  minilateralism: inclusiveness. Indeed, the ban-
king union should provide a level playing field for 
both current and future members of  the euro-
zone. As Paweł Tokarski rightly emphasized, the 
design should not only assure “participation in the 
decision-making process and access to information 
but also the bank recapitalization tools.”58 A solid 
solution was offered in the Hübner Report, which 
suggested an extension of  the EU balance-of-pay-
ments mechanism tasks for the recapitalization of  
non-eurozone banks.
The Polish banking sector – which is the largest in 
Central Europe – has survived the crisis without 
any significant problems. Indeed, both the Polish 
deposit guarantee system and financial supervisory 
commission are functioning better than in many 
eurozone states. This may, however, not be suffici-
ent in the medium and long terms. Paweł Tokarski 
concluded that “one should remember that a natio-
nal guarantee system is only as strong as the sove-
reign government behind it. Poland’s debt-to-GDP 
ratio is expected to shrink due to the changes to 
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the private pension scheme, yet it is still above the 
levels of  Spain and Ireland before the global finan-
cial meltdown.”59
2.3 Energy Policy
Energy policy – including its security dimension 
– has also been an important aspect of  Polish for-
eign policy. In fact, the Polish approach to energy 
policy is to a large degree unique on a European 
scale. Firstly, Poland is the largest coal producer in 
the European Union; close to 90 percent of  elec-
tricity generated in the country comes from coal. 
Secondly, the considerable role of  fossil fuels from 
internal sources in Poland’s energy mix has allowed 
a low level of  dependence on energy imports. The 
Polish score in this regard is therefore 31 percent – 
well below the EU average of  53 percent.60
Nevertheless, the predominant position of  coal 
in the Polish energy mix has been considered by 
some European political circles as contradictory 
to the EU’s ambitious strategy to combat climate 
change. For Poland, major challenges have already 
been posed by the binding targets for the reduction 
of  CO2 emissions and the increase in the share 
of  renewables by 2020. Poland has stressed that 
the EU should respect member states’ sovereign 
right to decide about the structure of  their energy 
mix, which should be adjusted to the level of  
development and the structure of  member states’ 
economies. “So far, Poland has fulfilled all of  the 
limits set by the Kyoto Protocol, but mainly as an 
outcome of  the economy’s transformation after 
1989 and the decrease in the role of  heavy industry. 
However, there are claims that future EU climate 
policy, focused on a further decrease of  carbon 
dioxide emissions, will be too great a burden on 
the Polish economy.”61
Yet Poland has already been on track to meet its 
binding targets. In 2009, the government adopted 
a new energy strategy that envisages a considerable 
change over the next two decades. The share of  
renewable energy sources (from 6 percent in 2009 
to 19 percent in 2020),62 and of  crude oil, natural 
gas, and nuclear energy will increase in the Polish 
energy mix, while the significance of  coal should 
decrease. The Polish commitment to meet the tar-
gets is based on a fundamental assumption that any 
action aiming at a formulation of  the EU climate 
policy until 2030 should respect member states’ 
sovereign right to decide about the structure of  
their energy mix as well as take into account the 
level of  development and the structure of  member 
states’ economies. In a report published in 2011 by 
a team of  strategic advisors to the prime minister, 
the potential cost of  the necessary modernization 
of  the Polish energy sector by 2030 amounts to 
100 billion euros.63 Moreover, in an analysis publis-
hed by the National Bank of  Poland in 2012, this 
cost – within the same timeframe – was estimated 
at a level of  200 billion euros.64
One of  the most important aspects of  this transi-
tion will be linked to natural gas. As the geopolitics 
and technology of  natural gas continue to change 
rapidly – with such developments as shale gas pro-
duction and liquefied natural gas (LNG) transport 
– the EU would do well to consider the strategic 
value of  supply diversification. Crises in 2006 and 
2009, both the result of  intentional supply decrea-
ses from Russia, highlight the risks of  overdepen-
dence on any one source for this vital commodity. 
But overreliance on Russia is not the only possible 
source of  distress for the European market; from 
environmental concerns to instability in other 
potential supplier nations, every natural gas supply 
comes with its own set of  challenges and risks. For 
this reason, an “all sources” strategy for natural gas 
production – one that spreads the risk and minimi-
zes the impact of  a reduction in any one source of  
supply – should typify the European approach in 
the years to come.
To illustrate why, one need look no further than 
the aforementioned 2006 and 2009 crises. In 
both cases, Russian disagreements with Ukraine 
resulted in a decrease of  supply from the former 
to the latter, a move that by extension decreased 
supplies to large swathes of  Europe, since the 
massive Druzhba pipeline crosses Ukraine to reach 
the European destinations. In 2006, this supply 
decrease directly affected Austria, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Croatia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia in mid winter. In 2009, affected countries 
were Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Greece, 
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Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Turkey. Clearly, 
such large-scale impact from the reduction of  a 
single source is unacceptable. More gas sources are 
crucial to European energy security.65
One reason this is so challenging is the very scope 
of  Russia’s share of  the world’s natural gas reserves. 
The country owns the largest natural gas reserves 
in the world: more than 27 percent of  the global 
total. Gazprom, a company in which Russia holds 
a majority stake, is the key exporter and one of  
the largest conventional natural gas companies in 
the world. Gazprom alone supplies one quarter of  
Europe’s conventional natural gas and more than 
70 percent of  the conventional natural gas for the 
countries of  the former Soviet Union. In some 
European countries, all gas supplies are imported 
solely from Russia. Even as the Russian share of  
European gas imports is predicted to level off  
(with Norway and some North African countries 
providing diminishing amounts, and countries from 
the Caucasus and Middle East providing an increa-
sing share), the sheer volume of  Russia’s gas supply 
will make it a formidable factor for the foreseeable 
future.
Other sources of  gas must be explored and exploi-
ted, and two major developments have already 
started to revolutionize the European gas market. 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments to Europe, 
especially from the United States, have already 
impacted Russia’s market share, and terminals to 
receive LNG have been constructed in the UK, 
Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Greece, and Norway. 
Poland has started to build its own LNG terminal 
in Świnoujście, the completion of  which is fore-
seen for 2014–15.
Even more crucial is the advent of  shale gas, which 
has the potential to change radically the energy 
security paradigm for Europe. In the EU, Poland 
has led the way as the country with one of  the 
largest shale deposits and with the greatest commit-
ment to making unconventional gas commercially 
viable. As the pioneer in European commerciali-
zation of  shale gas, Poland is trying to learn and 
implement the most effective practices used in the 
USA and Canada.66 However, as Andrew Michta 
rightly emphasized, “moving from [shale gas] 
exploration to production involves a delicate balan-
cing act that must factor in not only how to price 
Polish production permits but also how to design 
a tax regime that satisfies the government and 
guarantees a healthy investment environment. That 
balancing act must also factor in the added costs of  
the infrastructure improvements needed to move 
heavy equipment into and gas out of  the country. 
In short, the key challenge for Polish legislators will 
be to ensure that unconventional gas will be not 
just a small addition to Poland’s energy mix but a 
game-changer that redefines how Europe develops 
and prices energy.”67
Yet Polish shale gas, if  produced in sufficient quan-
tities under workable regulatory, tax, and environ-
mental regimes, could end Europe’s dependence 
on Russia and, in the process, revolutionize how 
energy is produced, priced, and delivered across 
Europe. This would fundamentally change the 
nature of  Europe’s relations with Russia, rearran-
ging Europe’s security equation as well as its energy 
markets.
2.4 Security Policy
The days when security policy was the most impor-
tant domain of  any state’s foreign policy are gone. 
The first years of  the twenty-first century have 
confirmed that European states strive to econo-
mize their international activity. In this way, they 
build their positions based on strengthening eco-
nomic and social aspects. Furthermore, with the 
intensification of  the economic crisis, the Euro-
pean defense expenditures have been considerably 
reduced. In fact, this trend negatively affects the 
condition of  security policy in Europe. As a result 
of  the search for savings – often accidental and 
without very much needed consultation with allies 
and partners – combined with a growing belief  by 
European societies about the absence of  threats 
on the old continent, the debate about the future 
of  European security policy has become mundane. 
Indeed, talks on European security policy are no 
longer trendy. Many European politicians admit 
that it is pointless to highlight security aspects in 
their election programs. In fact, Europeans are sim-
ply not interested in security policy. Some would 
argue that Walter Hallstein was right when he 
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stated: “Do not waste time talking about defense. 
In the first place we do not understand it. In the 
second place, we will all disagree.”68
However, it is wrong to believe that the significance 
of  security policy was marginalized. For years, 
there have been significant changes in the Euro-
pean security environment. Factors include the 
growing assertiveness of  Russia, which was clearly 
reflected in the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and 
the annex ation of  Crimea in 2014; the expeditio-
nary character of  NATO’s out-of-area involvement 
(in Afghanistan and Libya); revolutions and unrest 
in North Africa and the Middle East; political 
and financial challenges facing the United States; 
the economic expansion and political ambitions 
of  China, including its growing involvement in 
the Asia-Pacific region; and America’s strategic 
response to Chinese regional expansion, which 
resulted in an uncertain level of  U.S. presence in 
Europe. Furthermore, while Europe spends less 
and less on defense, the world treats it as a priority; 
in the new arms race, Europe is at the very end of  
the line. All these processes carry one risk, namely 
that the importance of  the old continent will decre-
ase and its security and defense policy will continue 
to depreciate.69
Insufficient involvement of  the European states 
in the debate about the condition of  its security, 
including the challenges, threats, and opportuni-
ties that European defense policy faces, should be 
interpreted as a syndrome of  self-depreciation. In 
Poland’s opinion, any deepening of  this trend will 
lead to a further weakening of  European security 
and – in a worst-case scenario – it will give rise to 
national self-centeredness.
Poland’s attachment to the issue of  the security 
policy naturally derives from its historical experi-
ence, geographical location, and its own limited 
potential. Warsaw cannot afford to refrain from 
being involved in building stronger and more 
effective European security. Despite the economic 
crisis, Poland actively co-leads the debate about 
a new vision of  the “Europe of  Defence” and, 
more importantly, puts its political postulates into 
practice.
Poland believes that investment in the national 
defense potential – its modernization and develop-
ment – is nothing other than sharing the responsi-
bility for the security of  the transatlantic area and 
preparing to act beyond it in the future should the 
need arise. Ultimately, NATO and the EU will be 
effective only if  their member states are strong and 
efficient. Therefore, despite the economic crisis, 
Poland has made the modernization of  its armed 
forces a top priority.
Since August 2012, when President Bronisław 
Komorowski announced the Polish defense 
modernization initiative, the air and missile defense 
system has been in the limelight, becoming the 
buzzword on both sides of  the Atlantic. The scope 
of  the modernization effort is, however, far more 
complex, and consists of  four distinct elements.
First, the Polish army will be considerably 
strengthened. Armored forces, even if  perceived 
by some European states as a hulking, overpriced 
holdover from a bygone era, play a crucial role 
in Poland’s defense strategy. This will render the 
Polish army one of  the heaviest in both Central 
and Western Europe.
Second, Poland has accelerated its naval force 
modernization program, which foresees a total 
spending of  2.5 billion euros (10 billion PLN) by 
2030. Without this major investment, the Polish 
navy would soon lose its operational capacity, as 17 
of  its 41 combat vessels are scheduled to be with-
drawn from service by 2022.
Third, the most modern component of  the Polish 
armed forces – the air force – will also be further 
enhanced by introducing a new advanced jet trai-
ner system of  eight aircraft by 2017. In addition, 
the helicopter fleet, which is to be used by dif-
ferent sections of  the armed forces, will be fully 
modernized.
Fourth, the Polish defense industry, which could 
play the role of  a linchpin in the modernization 
effort, needs clear strategic guidance. In 2013, the 
ministry of  economy, the ministry of  treasury, and 
the ministry of  national defense set out a plan for 
the consolidation of  the industry to help Polish 
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companies deal with the challenges of  an evol-
ving European market. The ongoing debate on 
strengthening Europe’s defense sector has shown 
that there is a temptation among some EU mem-
ber states, as well as the European Commission, to 
equate consolidation with competitiveness. From 
their perspective, the best way to boost the econo-
mic development of  European defense industries 
is to further consolidate second-tier and third-
tier firms (i.e. the small and medium enterprises), 
rapidly phase out offsets, and limit the importance 
of  Article 346 of  the Lisbon Treaty. Unfortunately, 
these false assumptions could lead to an even more 
unbalanced development of  Europe’s defense 
industries. This approach would primarily bene-
fit European industrial champions – the first-tier 
companies from just six member states: France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. They dominate the market by virtue of  
their size, technological sophistication, high level 
of  investment in research and development, and 
the political support they receive. The small and 
medium enterprises that prevail in other member 
states – including Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia – will thus have a limited 
chance of  successfully competing in a market dri-
ven solely by economic forces. Poland cannot stop 
the consolidation process on the European level, 
so its only viable solution is to channel it in a way 
that best serves both Polish and regional interests. 
Ideally, Poland should counteract the possibility of  
an eventual increase of  such discrepancies by sup-
porting an equal regional distribution of  the funds 
dedicated to increasing competitiveness in the sec-
tor, while securing the necessary political, economic, 
and technological backing for small and medium 
enterprises. Poland should also make a virtue of  
necessity and ultimately seek to change its indige-
nous defense industry landscape.70
Moreover, Poland’s security modernization pro-
gram cannot be “art for art’s sake”. Managing the 
process in a new strategic context will be far from 
easy, but doing it effectively is essential. The best 
way to ensure success is getting the security and 
defense strategy right. The new-old rationale was 
laid out by foreign minister Sikorski in his annual 
address in March 2013: “History teaches us that 
Poland must look to itself  to look after its security 
– also in the military sense – and that this security 
largely depends on our own defense potential. As 
Jan Nowak-Jeziorański once wrote, ‘you must not 
base your security on your allies alone, even the 
most formidable ones, if  you cannot use your own 
forces to enable these allies to come to your help. A 
feeling of  security cannot become a myth that leads 
to mental disarmament and gives rise to laziness of  
military thought.’”71
If  one could name one unique novel element in 
the Polish strategy, it would be the recurrence of  
deterrence. Once the backbone of  many national 
security strategies, with time it has almost vani-
shed from the vocabulary of  strategic debate. Yet 
from a Polish perspective this concept has not 
become obsolete, as it provides a viable solution 
to the strategic problems laid down by Sikorski in 
his 2013 address. Indeed, deterrence is a strategy 
for addressing two competing goals: countering a 
potential enemy or threat, and avoiding war.
On June 3, 2013, Donald Tusk and Tomasz 
Siemoniak, the minister of  national defense 
announced the initiation of  a project called 
“Polish Fangs”. Its goal is to develop the essen-
tial military capabilities necessary to implement 
a deterrence strategy. In practice, “Polish Fangs” 
will be comprised of  cruise missiles for both 
the F-16 fleet and for conventional submarines, 
combat drones, and special operations forces, as 
well as the Polish Navy Coastal Defense Missile 
Battalion system. Moreover, it is likely that this 
project will be supplemented by both defensive 
and offensive cyber weapons, as cyber capabilities 
will become a priority in the next strategic plan-
ning cycle.
Furthermore for Poland, the EU’s Common Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an ambitious, 
gradually broadening field of  activity. Its goal 
is to provide security for its member states and 
more stability in their neighborhood. A closer V4 
involvement in its development serves both pur-
poses. The V4 strategy for a strong CSDP – refer-
ring to the principles of  minilateralism – should 
therefore be based on ten objectives:
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1) Enhancing the planning capabilities and the 
functioning of  the EU structures as well as cri-
sis management mechanisms (e.g. strengthening 
the EU Operations Centre)
2) Enhancing civil-military cooperation in the 
CSDP framework (comprehensive approach)
3) Strengthening the EU-NATO operational 
cooperation
4) Enhancing cooperation with EU partners 
within the CSDP framework, especially with the 
Eastern Partnership countries
5) Enhancing flexibility and usability of  the battle 
groups (i.e. increasing burden sharing of  their 
deployment and redeployment; enhancing the 
concept of  the permanent framework nations 
on the operational stand-by every three years; 
including civilian components)
6) Developing the joint projects identified by the 
European Defence Agency (remotely pilo-
ted aircraft systems, air-to-air refueling, cyber 
defense)
7) Harmonizing EU and NATO actions (“poo-
ling and sharing” as well as “smart defense” 
initiatives)
8) Fostering a balanced and sustainable develop-
ment of  the European defense industries, rely-
ing on equal and regional distribution of  finan-
cial instruments that support competitiveness in 
defense R&T and foster the dual use
9) Supporting the access of  small and medium 
enterprises to the European defense market
10) Enhancing regional specialization by the crea-
tion of  defense centers of  excellence
Finally, the development of  the security and 
defense policy of  the EU depends on clear and up-
to-date strategic guidance. The currently binding 
strategy suffers political sclerosis and no longer 
reflects the security environment. It is therefore 
high time to revitalize l’esprit communautaire and 
to adjust the EU to the “new normal” by initia-
ting a review process and amendment of  the 2003 
European Security Strategy. Its backbone must 
be based not only on common values but also on 
common interests. A new strategic EU document 
should focus on identifying detailed tasks to be 
carried out by EU institutions and define prerogati-
ves that should be developed by means of  political 
process. Moreover, more concrete mechanisms for 
its implementation, which will institutionalize the 
EU strategic debate in the future, should be estab-
lished. A provision for a regular update of  subse-
quent EU security strategies is another key element 
that should be ensured. In this review process, it is 
deemed advisable to use positive experiences from 
the work on developing the latest NATO Strate-
gic Concept, e.g. by calling into being a Wise Men 
Group.
2.5 Economic and Political Partnerships
According to the report released in December 
2013 by the Centre for Economics and Business 
Research, Poland – currently the 23rd economy in 
the world – will break into the top 20 world econo-
mies by 2023.72 This will not materialize, however, 
without three factors contributing to economic 
development: the competitiveness of  the economy, 
trade partnerships, and foreign direct investment 
(FDI).
Poland currently finds itself  in a group of  coun-
tries transitioning from the efficiency-driven state 
of  development into the innovation-driven stage.73 
This grouping includes countries like Brazil, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Mexico, Slovakia, and Turkey.74 In 
practice, the innovation-driven stage means that 
companies must be ready to compete by producing 
new and different goods using the most sophistica-
ted production processes – and by innovating new 
ones.
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Despite being in the efficiency-driven stage, in 2013 
Poland became the most competitive economy 
within the V4. As noted by the World Economic 
Forum, Poland’s strengths include: its large market 
size, high educational standards (in particular its 
enrollment rates), and a well-developed financial 
sector.75 However, as underlined in the report, “as 
Poland transitions to the innovation-driven stage of  
development, it will have to focus more strongly on 
developing capacities in R&D and business sophis-
tication. Stronger R&D orientation of  companies, 
easier access to venture capital, and intensified col-
laboration between universities and the private sec-
tor would help the country to move toward a more 
future-oriented development path.”76
Owing to a more competitive economy, Poland was 
able to strengthen two other pillars of  economic 
development: its foreign trade and the inflow of  
FDI.
After a growth in Polish exports of  12.1 percent 
recorded in 2011, in 2012 exports slowed down 
to 4.6 percent (value: 146.6 billion euros).77 As for 
imports, they increased by 12.2 percent in 2011, 
Table 2: The Global Competitiveness Index, 
EU Member States in 2013–14
Country Rank Score
Austria 16 5.15
Belgium 17 5.13
Bulgaria 57 4.31
Croatia 75 4.13
Cyprus 58 4.3
Czech Republic 46 4.43
Denmark 15 5.18
Estonia 32 4.65
Finland 3 5.54
France 23 5.05
Germany 4 5.51
Greece 91 3.93
Hungary 63 4.25
Ireland 28 4.92
Italy 49 4.41
Latvia 52 4.4
Lithuania 48 4.41
Luxembourg 22 5.09
Malta 41 4.5
The Netherlands 8 5.42
Poland 42 4.46
Portugal 51 4.4
Romania 76 4.13
Slovakia 78 4.1
Slovenia 62 4.25
Spain 35 4.57
Sweden 6 5.48
United Kingdom 10 5.37
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014 (World Econo-
mic Forum, Geneva, 2013)
Table 3: The Foreign Trade Turnover of 
Poland with other EU Member States in 
2012 (in percent)
Country Imports Exports
Austria 3.0 2.5
Belgium 3.9 2.7
Bulgaria 0.4 0.5
Cyprus 0.2 0.2
Czech Republic 6.4 8.3
Denmark 2.0 2.2
Estonia 0.1 0.8
Finland 1.5 1.0
France 6.8 7.7
Germany 37.1 33.1
Greece 0.3 0.5
Hungary 2.8 3.2
Ireland 1.0 0.4
Italy 9.1 6.4
Latvia 0.3 0.9
Lithuania 1.0 2.1
Luxembourg 0.3 0.2
Malta 0.0 0.0
The Netherlands 6.8 5.9
Portugal 0.5 0.4
Romania 1.1 2.0
Slovakia 3.6 3.4
Slovenia 0.6 0.4
Spain 3.6 2.6
Sweden 3.3 3.5
United Kingdom 4.2 8.9
Source: Yearbook of foreign trade. Statistics of Poland (Central Statistical 
Office, Warsaw, 2013)
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while by only 1.1 percent (value: 151.9 billion 
euros) in 2012. The Polish trade deficit in 2012 
amounted to 5.3 billion euros and, compared to the 
level noted in 2011, was reduced by over 4.7 billion 
euros.78
In 2012, the share of  European countries in Polish 
exports decreased to 88.8 percent (compared to 
89.6 percent in 2011 and 91.1 percent in 2008).79 
Although the decline has not been significant, the 
trend has continued, constituting proof  that Polish 
exporters are searching for new non-European 
outlets and are able to adjust in a flexible manner 
to the current situations in their trade partners’ 
markets.
Moreover, Polish exports to V4 countries in 2012 
brought mixed results. The Czech Republic and 
Slovakia found that Polish exports grew faster than 
in general (Slovakia – 11 percent, to 3.7 billion 
euros; Czech Republic – 6.2 percent, to 9.1 billion 
euros), while Hungary found itself  with a decline 
in Polish exports (of  0.9 percent, to 3.5 billion 
euros).80
As shown in Tables 3 and 4 – apart from the Vise-
grad Group – Germany and France have played an 
important role in the Polish economy. This impor-
tance extends to foreign policy as well. Together 
with Poland, these two countries form the Weimar 
Triangle. The format was initiated by the then 
ministers of  foreign affairs of  Poland (Krzysztof  
Skubiszewski), France (Roland Dumas), and Ger-
many (Hans-Dietrich Genscher) in Weimar on 
August 28, 1991. The initially informal meetings 
have with time turned into regular tripartite con-
sultations. In the initial stage, they were aimed at 
tightening collaboration among the three countries 
and overcoming the division of  Europe, as well 
as intro ducing the young democracies of  Central 
Europe, in particular Poland, to the community of  
European states. Once Poland joined NATO and 
the EU, the goal was achieved, and the objectives 
of  the Weimar collaboration had to be redefi-
ned. Currently, the Weimar Triangle serves as a 
forum for consultations and developing common 
positions on key European policy issues. In fact, 
the Weimar Triangle has the potential to become 
one of  the most influential political groupings 
within the EU. In addition to involving three key 
countries, it encompasses two essential European 
bilateralisms: Franco-German and Polish-German 
relations.81
For Poland, France, and Germany it was natural 
that at a time of  serious budgetary restrictions and 
painful austerity measures, Europe had to reassess 
its political ambitions and ratchet up its efforts 
to reverse negative trends in its global influence. 
With this in mind, Poland has increasingly sought 
to revitalize close coordination within the Weimar 
format. That initiative took on greater urgency in 
2010, when Poland was preparing to take over the 
rotating presidency of  the Council of  the Euro-
pean Union in July 2011. Since then, the Weimar 
Table 4: Foreign Direct Investment in Poland 
from the EU Member States in 2012 (in mil-
lion euros)
Country Total FDI inflows
Austria 648
Belgium 319.9
Bulgaria -32.7
Cyprus 514.3
Czech Republic 41.8
Denmark 83.8
Estonia 18.3
Finland 134
France 3132.3
Germany 3494,1
Greece -354.5
Hungary 183.4
Ireland 192.2
Italy 299.6
Latvia 7.1
Lithuania 9.6
Luxembourg -3222.4
Malta -136.1
The Netherlands -1708
Portugal 128.9
Romania 1.4
Slovakia 69.2
Slovenia -25
Spain 344.3
Sweden -902.3
United Kingdom 843.4
Source: Authors’ research based on the National Bank of Poland data.
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Triangle has been perceived as a vanguard in many 
fields but particularly in the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP). The road map for 
progress has been established in the so-called “Wei-
mar letter” sent to the EU’s High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine 
Ashton, in December 2010. Indeed, the Weimar 
Triangle’s ministers of  defense and foreign affairs 
states expressed impatience with the EU’s percei-
ved dithering. The letter called for bold decisions 
in order to make CSDP more cost-effective and 
efficient, and it made clear that in the years to 
come, CSDP will remain the flagship of  the trilate-
ral cooperation. The road map included a necessary 
reform of  the battle group concept, more efficient 
civil-military crisis management, a strengthening of  
cooperation between the EU and NATO – espe-
cially between the European Defence Agency and 
NATO’s Allied Command Transformation – as 
well as the pooling and sharing of  European 
defense capabilities.
In fact, what helped the Weimar Triangle to attract the 
attention of  the other member states – especially Italy 
and Spain (the so-called Weimar Triangle Plus format) 
– to its cooperation, were the group’s effectiveness and 
visibility as well as its ability to cooperate with other 
regional formats (e.g. the V4).82 The Weimar Triangle 
therefore proved to be ready to operate according 
to the principles of  minilateralism. Under these cir-
cumstances, the Weimar Triangle could play three 
vital roles in the EU. Kai-Olaf  Lang and Daniela 
Schwarzer rightly suggested the following functions: 
serving as a clearinghouse (contributing to developing 
compromises), providing impetus (specifically placing 
issues on the EU’s political agenda), and providing 
political guidance (developing long term strategies).83
However, owing to its rising potential, Poland has 
also sought to operate beyond the EU both poli-
tically and economically. In 2012, North America 
represented 2.5 percent in Polish exports and 
2.8 percent in imports. The exports from Poland 
reached the level of  3.5 billion euros – 8.9 percent 
higher than in 2011. Moreover, imports showed a 
growth of  18.3 percent (value: 4.4 billion euros). 
As a result, the deficit in trade with North America 
deepened by 0.4 billion euros, to over 0.8 billion 
euros.84
In fact, it comes as no surprise that the United 
States has always occupied a special place in Polish 
foreign policy, especially regarding its security 
aspects. From a Polish perspective, Europe needs 
first and foremost to better understand its current 
role in US foreign and security policy. Long before 
the economic crisis of  2008, U.S. policymakers 
had begun to view Europe in general, and Central 
Europe in particular, as a “checked box.” As Wess 
Mitchell emphasizes, “under the Obama Adminis-
tration, the de facto retrenchment of  US power 
from Europe has accelerated. This is partly due 
to the combined effect of  austerity, strategic chal-
lenges in Asia, and the steady hollowing-out of  
NATO as a military alliance.”85 European countries 
should therefore rebuild their current relationships 
with the US by taking into consideration the new 
role of  the U.S. on the old continent. For Poland, 
this new approach means a policy of  pursuing both 
common values (democracy promotion, mutual 
defense clause) as well as common interests (inter-
operability of  the respective armed forces, missile 
defense, shale gas exploration). In fact, two fields 
of  collaboration in the security realm seem to be 
the most promising.
The first field is military cooperation. In December 
2010, Presidents Barack Obama and Bronisław 
Komorowski agreed to pursue closer military-to-
military cooperation between the US and Poland 
by creating a platform for joint work by the two 
air forces. Two years later, the first US Air Force 
detachment at the Łask air base in Poland became 
operational. In fact, the aviation detachment offers 
an opportunity to modify the security narrative 
in Central Europe. It has been a small permanent 
presence on the ground with more substantial rota-
tional presence (uniformed personnel and civilian 
contractors flying F-16s and C-130s). Beginning in 
2013, the enhanced US presence has accelerated 
the training process and has increased interoperabi-
lity between the two air forces.
The second field is, Poland’s role in the Euro-
pean Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile 
defense architecture. EPAA phase one gained its 
first operational elements in 2011 with the start 
of  the sustained deployment of  an Aegis BMD-
capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean and 
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the deployment of  an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey. 
Moreover, in 2011, Spain agreed to host four US 
Aegis-capable ships at the existing naval facility 
at Rota. For the second phase, the US reached 
an agreement with Romania that was ratified in 
December 2011 to host a US land-based SM-3 
interceptor site beginning in the 2015 timeframe. 
The third phase is centered on the first of  the 
three host nations to ratify the hosting agreement: 
Poland. This agreement places a land-based inter-
ceptor site in Redzikowo and includes the SM-3 
Block IIA interceptors. As underlined by U.S. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of  State Frank A. Rose 
during his speech at the National Defense Uni-
versity in Warsaw on April 18, 2013, “this EPAA 
phase three site is on schedule and on budget for 
deployment in the 2018 timeframe. The intercep-
tor site here in Poland will be key to the EPAA. 
Not only will it protect Poland itself, but when 
combined with the rest of  the EPAA assets, phase 
three will be able to protect all of  NATO Europe 
against ballistic missile threats from the Middle 
East.”86
Finally, Asia has become a crucial market for 
Polish goods with a share of  6.2 percent in Polish 
exports in 2012. Indeed, Polish exports to Asia 
increased 2.5 times faster than in general, i.e. by 
12.2 percent (value: 8.9 billion euros). Despite the 
dynamic growth in exports, however, Poland still 
encountered a considerable deficit in trade with 
Asia (value: 19 billion euros).87
Poland, together with other V4 countries, tried 
to establish closer relations with two major Asian 
countries: China and Japan.
In 2012, Sikorski delivered a speech during a 
roundtable of  V4 and Chinese think tanks in 
which he emphasized the political and economic 
attractiveness of  the grouping. “It may not be 
widely known, but the total value of  the Visegrad 
Group GDP is approximately 1 trillion US dol-
lars. In terms of  purchasing power parity, the V4 
as a single entity, is fifteenth in the world, ahead 
of  the economies of  Indonesia, Turkey, and 
Australia.”88
In 2013, the prime ministers of  the V4 countries 
and Japan adopted a joint statement, “Partnership 
based on common values for the twenty-first cen-
tury,” which set the benchmarks for the strategic 
cooperation in the areas of  the Eastern Partnership, 
official development assistance, security policy (the 
United Nations, the EU, NATO, the OSCE), eco-
nomy, science, technology, and innovation, as well 
as culture and education.89
Conclusions
In his 1985 statement before the U.S. Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of  State 
George P. Shultz rightly emphasized that “soon 
after the dawn of  the nuclear age, Albert Einstein 
observed that everything had changed except our 
ways of  thinking. Even so dramatic a development 
as the nuclear revolution took a long time to be 
fully understood; how much longer has it usually 
taken to understand the implications of  more 
subtle, intangible historical changes taking place 
around us. […] Change is constant. […] Power 
continues to be dispersed and the structure of  
political relations more complex, even as the inter-
dependence of  states increases. Einstein’s observa-
tion takes on new relevance: our ways of  thinking 
must adapt to new realities; we must grasp the new 
trends and understand their implications.”90
An effective state needs an intelligent foreign 
policy that is based on lessons learned and clear 
strategic principles. Table 5 represents a foreign 
policy strategy for Poland until 2020. Based on the 
following ten principles, Polish decision makers 
can strengthen the position of  Poland on both the 
European and global levels.
Poland should engage in a further rise of  effective 
minilateralism – especially within the V4, the Wei-
mar Triangle, and the Baltic Rim – which could be 
based on four rules of  thumb.
1. Visibility: This goal could be reached by 
announcing common positions on the eve 
of  major events in international politics (e.g. 
NATO summits, European Council summits, 
international crises).
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2. Specialization: An accurate formulation of  areas 
in which the minilateral formats can consciously 
participate could generate an added value, faci-
litating the harmonization of  the activities of  
the groupings. It seems that security policy, for 
example, could become a specialty of  the V4, 
the Weimar Triangle, and the Baltic Rim in the 
future.
3. Openness to the world: The minilateral formats 
with Polish participation should sustain the pace 
of  ongoing dialogue with allies and partners 
as it manages to promote the Polish vision in 
foreign affairs and regional sensitivity to such 
delicate issues as economic integration, energy 
policy, and security policy. Openness to the 
world also means an active and timely engage-
ment – best encapsulated by the slogan: “pro-
pose, act, propose, act.”91
4. A solid attachment to the principles of  functio-
nalism:92 The minilateral formats should act to 
the benefit of  wider interest, especially in the 
development of  institutions and practices that 
contribute to international peace. Such an acti-
vity should not in fact be perceived as illegiti-
mate altruism but as an expression of  awareness 
of  the medium-sized countries and the fact that 
their main interest lies in an arranged and pre-
dictable international environment.
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Table 5: Foreign Policy Strategy for Poland until 2020
1. Realism
The position of Poland on the international scene should be based on actual links and con-
nections with allies and other strategic partners. International status and formal aspects play a 
secondary role.
2. Military Potential
Formal security guarantees (e.g. treaties) cannot be treated as an ultimate way of assuring inde-
pendence. Consequently, there is a necessity to invest in one’s own military potential, including 
new domains (e.g. cyberspace). 
3. Consolidation An ongoing erosion of European and transatlantic institutional structures could weaken the Polish position in the world. Therefore, Poland should aim at consolidating both the EU and NATO.
4. Neighborhood
Relations with neighbors have always defined the foreign policy potential of Poland. As a result, 
there is a need to look for a new perspective in bilateral relations with the two most influential 
ones: Germany and Russia. 
5. Values and Interest
Relations with allies and partners should be based on both values (which are constant) and inte-
rests (which are variable). Only by obtaining the right balance between these aspects can Poland 
become a full-fledged foreign policy actor. 
6. Net-centricity
In a globalized world, a capability to operate in a dense network of bilateral and multilateral 
connections is a must. Poland should reject any idea of being closely linked with only one inter-
national actor. In fact, multiple international anchors are necessary (with the EU as the most 
important one). 
7. Internal Reforms A distinction between foreign and domestic policy has over the last two decades become blur-red. Currently, foreign policy is a direct extension of internal integrity.
8. Regionalization
The ongoing process of regionalization in Europe offers both opportunities and challenges. 
Poland’s role is to take advantage of the former. This aim could be primarily obtained within the 
formats of the Visegrad Group (and the Visegrad Plus), the Weimar Triangle (and the Weimar Tri-
angle Plus), and the Baltic Rim.
9. Modesty In international politics, each should punch according to his weight. Modest foreign policy, howe-ver, should not be passive or lack ambition.
10. Openmindedness Poland cannot concentrate its activities only on itself. Polish foreign policy should therefore be based on the formula do ut des (“I give that you might give”). 
Source: Authors’ research based on P. Grudziński, Państwo inteligentne. Polska w poszukiwaniu międzynarodowej roli (Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 
Toruń, 2008) pp. 152–155.
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